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The (im)possibilities of Levinas for Christian Theology: the search for a language of 
alterity 
 
Short description: The paper aims to show how Levinas’ philosophy opens up a style of 
thinking and suggests a vocabulary of expression that can serve Christian theology, especially 
by opening the possibility of a language of alterity, or radical “otherness”, in theology. At the 
very risk of falling into the language of onto-theology, the paper will make use of a number 
of Levinasian notions to enhance Hans Urs von Balthasar’s theological reading of John 
20:19-23 and his analogy of the transcendentals.  The sense of the non-phenomenality of 
Christ’s otherness will be pivotal to our inquiry and our hope to unite theological language 
and ethical transcendence together. 
 
An intense interest is emerging between the connection between the philosophy of Emmanuel 
Levinas and Christian theology.  In a number of countries, especially Holland, Belgium, 
France, the United States, Italy and South America, Levinas’ work has found its greatest 
readership among Christian philosophers and theologians.1  To this list of countries I would 
also add the United Kingdom and Australia where a growing number of authors, and in 
particular, Michael Purcell, Graham Ward, Michael Barnes, David Ford and Terry Veling 
have related Levinas’ ideas to particular theologians, saints or to specific areas of theology.2   
 
As with the writers I have referred to, I have found that the writings of Emmanuel Levinas 
contain many ideas of value for Christian theology.  One of my major courses of study has 
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been using Levinas’ thought to enhance the theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar.3 My method 
here involved:  
(i) Remarking on Christian theology’s discovery of Levinas’ philosophy;  
(ii) Introducing three of the major influences of Levinas’ philosophy, namely Edmund 
Husserl, Martin Heidegger and Franz Rosenzweig; 
(iii) Presenting a number of Levinasian notions to critique and complement the 
theology of Hans Urs von Balthasar under some eleven headings: the there is; 
time, the Other, God, encounter, exposure, passivity, prayer, having a sense, truth 
and ethical transcendence; 
(iv) Recontextualising, through Levinasian analysis, major sections of von Balthasar’s 
theology (aesthetics, dramatics and logic), namely his treatment of Holy Saturday, 
the Resurrection, Trinitarian and Soteriological “Inversion”, and truth as 
participation; 
(v) Attempting to develop a prolegomenon to a Trinitarian praxis.  Intrinsic to the 
very understanding of this Trinitarian praxis is the notion of alterity to such a 
degree that ethical transcendence is the very inspiration for theology if it is to go 
beyond the limits of objectivity, being and presence.  The prolegomenon, 
therefore, contains an articulation of Trinitarian praxis in the context of ethical 
transcendence, eschatology and soteriology.  To this end, I particularly employed 
Levinas’ ideas of passivity and otherness to critique von Balthasar’s 
eschatological conception of Christian existence and his soteriological 
understanding of the eucharist. 
(vi) Providing abundant references to Husserl, Heidegger and Rosenzweig at various 
junctures in this study as Levinas and von Balthasar have both used their writings; 
and 
(vii) Finally, critically examining the views of four Christian theologians who have 
been influenced by Levinas (Purcell, Ward, Barnes and Ford) whilst bringing 
Levinas and von Balthasar in conversation.  
 
The method here provided an horizon to conclude that, with the aid of Levinas’ ideas, 
theology is offered the possibility of breaking out of the limits imposed by traditional notions 
of objectivity, being and presence.  In reaching such a conclusion, I found new ways of 
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 See my PhD Dissertation, Levinas, von Balthasar and Trinitarian Praxis (Australian Catholic University, 
2004). 
 3 
speaking of the Christian mysteries such as Holy Saturday and the Resurrection, in a non-
phenomenal manner.  Using Levinas’ ethical metaphysics, I further discovered that the 
deepest problem to be faced by a theology is one of giving priority to the ethical over the 
ontological.  Consequently, by learning from Levinas, I argued for a conception of Christian 
life that goes beyond the categories of ontology and experience. Accordingly, I proposed a 
notion of Trinitarian praxis in which we come to God by way of ethical transcendence. In 
other words, we come to God by taking to heart the biblical call to be like God, welcoming 
the stranger, the widow and the orphan (Deut 10:18-19). Trinitarian praxis is being sensitive, 
open and intent enough to love our neighbour. 
 
Furthermore, I have found Walter Kasper’s theology, pastoral care and counselling and 
understanding psychosis as other germane contexts for developing Christian theology through 
a Levinasian lens.4 These connections reveal that there are a variety of possible contexts for 
Levinas’ pure philosophical thought to be related.   As a result, we can imagine ways to 
theologise beyond the categories of objectivity, presence and being.   
 
Given that Levinas’ thought has brought out the ethical significance of the Bible with the 
language of alterity, can we not do the same for theology? The (im)-possibilities lie on 
whether theology can ultimately be done beyond ontology, and further, whether it can return 
back to being with transcendence, peace, prayer and goodness.  To begin facing the 
impossible, the ambiguity of developing a sense of transcendence in being despite (or 
otherwise than) being, Christian theology needs a language of alterity in the hope of 
remaining faithful to intensifying the sense of encounter with Christ and of the other in him. 
 
Though drawing on Levinas’ ideas, it has been my assessment5 that Purcell, Ward, Barnes 
and Ford, are not prepared to sever their ties with ontology (the search to understand the 
meaning of Being), intentionality (consciousness itself) and hence, analogy (a method using 
the categories of Being and consciousness to make rational statements concerning God, 
humanity and the world).6  However, I do not blame them, for it is the very road that we all 
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must take or at least fall into. Whether we believe that Levinas’ thought can be appropriately 
discussed and used with notions of being, or whether, like Levinas, we wish to imagine 
otherwise, we will nonetheless, at some time, ostensibly or not, choose the good of being 
(like Purcell) or fall into its very contamination.  And whether or not we can discern the 
difference is another thing. Doing theology with Levinas is both possible and impossible.  It 
is largely possible because Levinas’ thought is like a treasury of keys to unlock the mysteries 
of personhood, prayer and ethics.  Yet, we also face a sense of the impossible as the language 
of alterity itself beckons a whole eternity to be proclaimed. We seem to be always late for the 
other and find it so hard to welcome our neighbour with a heart and a smile.  
 
Given our paradox, I suggest we need to find ways, as humbly as we can, to approach 
Levinas writings, discover a whole lexicon of terms, and use them for the benefit of Christian 
theology. I do not know whether Levinas himself would invite our interest eagerly lest we 
homogenize his sense of otherness into our personal experience. Yet he may be intrigued to 
see how we Christian theologians return to his writings with awe, respect and a search for the 
word of God. As we tremble and find courage to accept the face of the other and learn from 
Levinas, we may discover a desire to inform our conscience with personal responsibility for 
those on the margins of society.  With this in mind, we may also move from a sense of panic 
at facing the immensity of Levinas’ complex writings towards an emerging and prophetic 
process of finding a rational way to speak of both the incomprehensible other and infinite 
God.  
 
Fundamentally, Levinas’ thought might become possible for theology when we seek to renew 
essence or the process of being within the language of alterity, and thus conceive of theology 
otherwise than its ontological and phenomenal constructions that might lead us away from 
ethics, justice and mercy. In order to seek out the language of alterity, we will risk being 
thrown into the language of onto-theology in which the word God is sterilised by the tyranny 
of public and post-modern delusions that cry “me, me, me!”  Hence, granted that it is possible 
to encounter the word of “God”, it would not be unlikely to imagine a difficult condition of 
alterity, which, in turn, will demand that theoria and praxis must coincide.  In a Levinasian 
sense, alterity or otherness refers to being made responsible by the Other to such a degree that 
it overwhelms the intentionality of consciousness.  More fundamental still, the self is obliged 
to sacrifice for the Other to the point of expiation.  
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The grave implication to do theology with Levinas is to take on the difficult freedom of a 
biblical, kenotic life for others. Facing this honestly, through the recognition of responsibility 
for the other, may provide a possibility to traverse the conatus and effort of philosophical 
intelligence.  In other words, the testimony of ethical subjectivity aims to go beyond any form 
of philosophical objectivity. Facing the question of the impossibilities or possibilities of using 
Levinas’ thought for Christian theology is also to wrestle with the categories of objectivity, 
presence and being for finding a rational way of speaking of God. Consequently, considering 
the possibility of Levinas for Christian Theology, we want to begin to conceive of a language 
of alterity.  
 
As I have indicated, Levinas’ complex lexicon brims with new and suggestive terms.  Many 
of them such as the there is, trace, diachrony, ambiguity, immemorial past, the face, the 
Other, otherness, illeity, the Saying, testimony, incarnation, God, encounter, passivity, 
substitution, expiation, sacrifice, gift, conscience, death, prayer, truth, transcendence and 
humiliation beg to be translated into a Christian theological context.  Any attempt to employ 
and apply these terms for theological purposes will encounter resistance from those 
ideologically opposed to Levinas. For example, avoiding the significance of the non-
phenomenality of the face, some objectors might read the notion of the Levinasian Other as 
an abstraction without a personal and essential content. Others could simply be opposed to 
any scent of “leashing” Levinas’ thinking for reconceptualising Christian theology as it may 
result in facile and even tendentious simplifications.  
 
Given that Levinas himself was open to engaging with Christianity through writings and 
friendships, and that many Christian theologians are taking his thought seriously, it is my 
contention that Christian theology should likewise befriend Levinas’ thought with interest 
and care. As we begin to hear the word of God resound in Levinas, we can begin also to 
explore the possibility for theology to partake of his writings. Further, we might even dream 
of the impossible, “What no eye has seen, nor ear heard, nor the human heart conceived, what 
God has prepared for those who love him” (1 Cor 2:9)”, that is to say, to hope that a common 
ground and a common friendship can be found between Jews and Christians through the 
study of Levinas’ writings. 
 
In sum, Levinas’ thought and style are, as all admit, of unusual difficulty.  His writings are 
never easy, given the complexity, enigma and rigour of his style. Adriaan Peperzak, to give 
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but one instance, implies that it is impossible to arrive at a complete overall grasp of his 
thought.7  But Richard Cohen argues against trying to simplify or systemise it, or even relate 
too quickly to other disciplines, lest it be reduced to the ordinary level of moral imperatives.8  
It seems clear that Levinas does not leave us with a body of thought or system in any 
recognisable sense, as though he was dealing with a particular theory or ethical project.  It is 
more a deeply person-centred philosophy of moral conscience, developed in a context made 
up of a certain range of interlocutors.  Clearly the conviction animating my argument is that 
Levinas’ thinking should not be “totalised” in its complexity, but be respected in its 
capacities to inspire fresh deconstructive possibilities in other disciplines, above all, in 
theology.   
 
My special concern now will be engaging the theology of von Balthasar, no less a complex 
and many-faceted thinker than Levinas himself. In this regard, the inquiry will be limited to 
exemplifying my approach through firstly enhancing his study of John 20:19-23 where the 
risen Jesus identifies himself to the disciples, greets them with peace and initiates their 
mission with the power of the Holy Spirit. Our aim here is to focus on the non-phenomenality 
of the Resurrection in the specific context of von Balthasar’s theological aesthetics.   His 
reflection of the disciples’ encounter with the Risen Christ in Jn 20:19-23 provides a context 
to theologise with the language of alterity.  Secondly, and lastly, delving further into Jn 20: 
19-23, I hope to show that the Risen Christ’s otherness provides a foundation for an ethical 
metaphysical articulation of the transcendentals rather than an analogical and ontological one 
which underpins von Balthasar’s theology.   
 
Facing the (im)possibilities of using Levinas for Christian theology, I will employ four 
aspects of Levinas’ idea of illeity (diachrony, the immemorial, effacement and ambiguity), 
his sense of the non-phenomenality of the face, and his ideas of the Third, the there is, 
individuation, encounter, expiation and the Good beyond being. In all truth, by seeking to go 
beyond von Balthasar’s language of theology to refer to the Risen Christ, will most likely 
result in the impossibility of keeping faithful to von Balthasar’s theological boundaries. 
Indeed, it may seem like trespassing upon his thought as a means for developing a language 
of alterity for theology.  Yet, it is a risk and a trespass worth attempting to traverse beyond 
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8
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essence towards transcendence. We come, then, to a study of John 20:19-23 with von 
Balthasar and Levinas. 
 
A Study of John 20:19-23 with von Balthasar and Levinas 
Jn 20:19-23 follows on Jesus’ self-disclosure to Mary Magdalene and her announcement to 
the disciples of what she has seen and heard.  The passage reads as follows: 
 
When it was evening on that day, the first day of the week, and the doors of the 
house where the disciples had met were locked for fear of the Jews, Jesus came 
and stood among them and said, “Peace be with you.”  After he said this, he 
showed them his hands and his side.  Then the disciples rejoiced when they saw 
the Lord.  Jesus said to them again, “Peace be with you.  As the Father has sent 
me, so I send you.”  When he had said this, he breathed on them and said to them, 
“Receive the Holy Spirit.  If you forgive the sin of any, they are forgiven them; if 
you retain the sins of any, they are retained.” 
 
Commenting on this passage, von Balthasar explains the sending as, “an existential 
participation in Jesus’ self-abandonment, in which the Holy Spirit ‘blows’ (Jn 3:8) or is (Jn 
7:39)”.9  The participation is connected with a sacramental experience of eucharist and 
reconciliation.  In this, the reality of the Risen Christ surpasses that of a mediator because his 
identity is the eucharist, the forgiveness of sins in the condition of self-abandonment.  The 
Holy Spirit “blows or is” in Jesus’ eucharistic identity, enabling the disciples to receive the 
Easter gift of the power to forgive sins.10  It follows that Christ is accessible in his 
sacramentally objective mode, while the Holy Spirit is an object of knowledge and 
experience within such a mode of objectivity.   
 
Much of von Balthasar’s presentation of Christ - from the Incarnation through to the 
Resurrection – is structured by his use of analogy of being and the transcendentals.  
Reflecting on the analogy of the transcendentals, von Balthasar writes:  
                                                     
9
 Hans Urs von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, A Theological Aesthetics, Vol. VII, Theology: The New 
Covenant, translated by Brian McNeil (Edinburgh: T&T Clark, 1982), 151. 
10
 See von Balthasar, The Glory of the Lord, Vol. VII, 151-152. 
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God does not come primarily as a teacher for us (‘true’), as a ‘redeemer’ for us 
(good), but to display and to radiate himself, the splendour of his eternal triune 
love in that ‘disinterestedness’ that true love has in common with true beauty’.  
For the glory of God the world was created through it and for its sake the world is 
also redeemed.11 
Given von Balthasar’s privileging of beauty and its associated disinterestedness, there is the 
possibility of thinking beyond and outside his phenomenal and ontological framework.  In the 
passage just cited, he describes God objectively as a teacher, redeemer and one who “radiates 
himself”.  More generally, he speaks of God’s Being as the interplay between beauty, 
goodness, truth and glory (doxa).  In contrast to this, an ethical metaphysical conception of 
this interplay can be developed through treating the non-phenomenality of the Risen Christ’s 
face in our context of Jn 20:19-23.  To take this further, it will be necessary to refer to four 
aspects of the trace of illeity, namely diachrony, the immemorial, effacement and ambiguity.  
This will provide a basis to return to von Balthasar’s analogical language of the 
transcendentals for theology in the hope of thinking otherwise with the language of alterity.  
Accordingly, alterity rather than analogical thought can provide a way to articulate God’s 
glory, beauty, goodness, truth and unity as ethical transcendence. We press on to uncover the 
sense of the non-phenomenality of Christ’s otherness and face. 
 
The non-phenomenality of Christ’s Face 
In the resurrection narrative, the disciples are faced with the otherness of the Risen Christ.  
Here, we keep in mind that Christ’s otherness in its fullest dimensions also signifies the Holy 
Spirit in the depth of the Risen One.  In their approach to Christ in his risen appearance, the 
disciples are described by John as rejoicing when they see the Lord.  We could imagine that 
the disciples rejoice or go generously towards the Risen Christ because they have been faced 
by him in a metaphysical sense.  Their encounter with Christ (Jn 20) is beyond phenomenal 
experience, thus presuming an ontological unveiling of truth.  At this point the question arises 
as to how the disciples might express the Risen Christ’s otherness?  The resolution of such a 
quandary lies in their sacrificial action in their desire to participate in Christ’s self-
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 Hans Urs von Balthasar, My Work: In Retrospect (San Francisco: Ignatius Press, 1993), 80.  See also Angelo 
Scola, Hans Urs von Balthasar. A Theological Style, (Grand Rapids MI: William B. Eerdmans Publishing 
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abandonment.    In other words, the otherness or the non-phenomenality of Christ’s face 
commands the disciples to exist beyond their death like the Risen Christ himself.  Thus 
summoned with a morality of “being otherwise” than existing in the limits imposed by their 
own death, the disciples have the possibility of thinking of what had been closed to them, 
namely the incomprehensibility of Christ’s abandonment to the Father’s will.  Their 
experience and thought demand a language of alterity by which to express the desire to 
participate in Jesus’ self-abandonment through the Spirit to the Father.   
 
We must go further in this consideration of the non-phenomenality of the Resurrection, as we 
pick up again on the notion of desire.  The disciple’s desire for Christ unfolds as a plot of 
individuation and expiation as identity and alterity are united.  Like Christ’s individuation on 
Holy Saturday, the disciples’ individuation depends on the non-phenomenality of an 
encounter.  The idea of non-phenomenality is important because it makes space for the word 
“God” to be pronounced.  Levinas states: “The direct encounter with God, this is a Christian 
concept.  As Jews, we are always a threesome: I and you and the Third who is in our midst.  
And only as a Third does He reveal Himself”.12  The idea of “the Third” speaks of the trace 
of illeity and of a triadic structure between the I, the other and God.  In such a Levinasian 
frame of reference, we can conceive of the Resurrection from a different angle.  Even though 
the disciples are face to face with Christ, it is the non-phenomenal aspect of the encounter 
that is more significant, as can be indicated in reference to the trace of illeity and its bearing 
on the otherness of the Risen Christ. 
 
The Trace of Illeity 
The idea of the trace of illeity provides a non-phenomenal sense of the Risen Christ’s 
otherness.  We can discern then that it is not surprising that the disciples cannot make an 
authentically individuative response until Christ breathes the Spirit upon them.  Before 
receiving the Spirit, they are in a state of confusion as Luke’s Gospel describes, “They were 
startled and terrified, and thought they were seeing a ghost” (Luke 24:37).  With this in mind, 
let us consider how Levinas distinguishes illeity from the there is, the better to explicate the 
otherness that the Gospel witnesses to.  He writes: 
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Ethics is not a moment of being; it is otherwise and better than being, the very 
possibility of the beyond.  In this ethical reversal, in this reference of the desirable 
to the non-desirable, in this strange mission that orders the approach to the other, 
God is drawn out of objectivity, presence and being.  He is neither an object nor 
an interlocutor.  His absolute remoteness, his transcendence, turns into my 
responsibility – non-erotic par excellence – for the other.  And this analysis 
implies that God is not simply the “first other,” the “other par excellence,” or the 
“absolutely other,” but other than the other [autre qu’autrui], other otherwise, 
other with an alterity of the other, prior to the ethical bond with another and 
different from every neighbour, transcendent to the point of absence, to the point 
of possible confusion with the stirring of the there is.13 
 
Levinas states that for God to be drawn out of objectivity, presence and being, ethics must be 
conceived as the very possibility of the beyond.  The ethical metaphysical idea of God is 
otherwise and better than essence.  God can only be truly meant in reference to the 
neighbour’s proximity and the self’s responsibility for this Other.  God’s transcendence is an 
ethical signification of what is beyond essence.  Furthermore the trace of God in the Other’s 
face is described in four ways:  
●  diachronic (“other with an alterity of the other”); 
●  immemorial (“prior to the ethical bond”); 
●  effaced (“transcendent to the point of absence”); and  
●  ambiguous (“to the point of possible confusion with the stirring of the there is”).   
 
These four aspects of illeity (otherness) assist a theological interpretation of Christ’s 
otherness as recounted in Jn 20:19-23.  In other words, the event of the Resurrection evokes 
diachronic, immemorial, effaced and ambiguous aspects of God.  This is to argue that the 
approach inspires the disciples to exist in Christ’s victory over the power of death.  This 
conquering of death speaks of substitution to the point of expiation rather than the conatus of 
being.   
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 Emmanuel Levinas, Collected Philosophical Papers, translated by Alphonso Lingis (Pittsburgh PA: 
Duquesne University Press, 1998), 165-166. 
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There is diachronic aspect: it approaches God only by way of participation in Jesus’ self-
surrender.  The influence of the Resurrection is immemorial because the disciples have been 
called by Christ who in turn has been called by the Father before the time of creation to do 
his will.  It leads to effacement because in the presence of Christ a greater absence is signified 
in the objective world.  Lastly, the Resurrection works with a certain ambiguity, in a 
Levinasian sense, allowing for the possible confusion of illeity and the there is.  Like the 
stirring of the there is, the trace of illeity disturbs the self when the neighbour approaches. 
 
We have begun to present how the Spirit of the Risen Christ acts in ways that are diachronic, 
immemorial, effaced and ambiguous.  Here we may insert Levinas’ idea of the trace in a 
manner relevant to our interpretation of von Balthasar.  The encounter with the Risen Christ 
resists what must be reduced to history and memory in the synchrony of time, for it also 
signifies Christ’s Crucifixion and going to the dead on Holy Saturday.  The trace of God that 
marks the Risen Christ, inspires in the disciples a sense of Christ’s atonement for humanity.  
It overwhelms cognition.  In other words, when the Risen Christ approaches the disciples, his 
otherness signifies the trauma of being obedient to the Father’s will: this is an unimaginable 
encounter with the dead in hell.  The disciples too must suffer the trauma of being under the 
obligation to live lives of substitution to the point of expiation. The Spirit which Christ gives, 
disturbs and opens the disciples’ consciousness to the transcendence of Christ in regard to 
history.  Only in the site of transcendence, in this horizon of openness, can they express the 
word of God in their proclamation of God’s Reign.   Thus, the otherness of the Risen Christ 
appears in a non-phenomenal sense, never representable to their consciousness, but rather 
signified in their responsibility to, and for, others. 
 
To sum up: the Spirit of the Risen Christ inspires in the disciples a mission specified not only 
by Christ’s Crucifixion, but also by his going to the dead.  The disciples, like Christ, might be 
called to live a life of substitution to the point of expiation.  A Levinasian “otherness” helps 
to uncover what lies concealed in Jn 20:19-23.  In contrast to von Balthasar, we would argue 
for a hearing of the Gospel’s enigmatic language through the language of alterity. For this 
purpose, I will firstly examine von Balthasar’s understanding of the transcendentals.  After 
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that, I will focus more precisely on the ideas of diachrony, the immemorial, effacement and 
ambiguity as they relate to Christ’ otherness in the resurrection narrative. 
The Transcendentals and the Language of Alterity 
Von Balthasar’s theological aesthetics focus on the form and beauty of God’s glory.  What he 
describes and explains has an ontological and phenomenological structure.   His aesthetics 
and, indeed, his whole trilogy uses the analogy of the transcendentals as the lens by which the 
qualities of God’s Being might be experienced.  Let us look more closely at the way von 
Balthasar makes use of the analogy of the transcendentals in his theology. In the following 
example, he argues that the theological transcendentale of glory is in an indissoluble 
perichoresis with the philosophical transcendentalia of the one, the beautiful, the good and 
the true: 
 
In so far as doxa is a theological transcendentale, it necessarily has something in 
common with the philosophical transcendentalia of being (the one, the true, the 
good, the beautiful): namely, that it exists in an indissoluble perichoresis with 
these, such that everything that is theologically true is also good and glorious, and 
everything that is glorious is so to the extent that it is also good and true; for God 
himself is the original One, and all his self-manifestations bear the seal of this 
unity.  Therefore too all dogmas are only aspects of the one, indivisible, good and 
beautiful truth of God.14 
 
The passage explains the existence of the transcendentals in God on the basis of the analogy 
between God and statements about God (dogmas).  In other words, the analogy of being is the 
underlying foundation for the analogy of the transcendentals.  Von Balthasar emphasises that 
the philosophical transcendentals are properties of God’s Being of glory by speaking of 
perichoresis.  This manner of speaking follows from the purpose of theological aesthetics, 
namely to articulate the qualities of God’s Being as dogma in the hope that these qualities can 
be incorporated into Christian praxis.15  However, in line with Levinas, we might presume to 
suggest a formulation that is “otherwise than being”.   
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15
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Inasmuch as von Balthasar understands doxa to be a theological transcendental quality of 
God’s Being, he must admit that such understanding depends on an ontological unveiling.  
For him, glory is the Lord’s intrusion upon consciousness.16  In Scola’s reading of this matter, 
he notes, for example, when God’s Being is perceived as a formal object, the thematisation of 
the object of consciousness as the beautiful means to be dominated by God’s glory (doxa).17  
This is to say that God’s glory becomes a manifestation in consciousness intent on 
explanation and proofs of the qualities of God’s Being.  In short, theoria precedes praxis. 
   
Still, von Balthasar’s intention is always to protect the reality of divine transcendence.  For 
that reason he employs the various types of analogy.  On the other hand, he appears to limit 
the conception of God to the transcendental properties of being.  This analogical position is 
grounded in a “renewed phenomenology” by which to gaze upon God’s glory through 
representations accessible to the eyes of faith.18  A counterposition to both von Balthasar’s 
ontology and phenomenology can be developed by way of Levinasian ethical transcendence 
and sense of otherness.  I hope to show that which will throw light on the unique character of 
the otherness of the Risen Lord – in a manner that evades the constraints of being and 
phenomenal experience. Specifically, I want to show how the four aspects of the Levinasian 
idea of the trace of illeity (diachrony, immemorial past, effacing and ambiguity) can lead us 
to an articulation of the beauty, goodness and truth of the risen Christ’s glory in the language 
of alterity.     
 
Diachrony and Immemorial Time 
For von Balthasar, the Resurrection, like the death and burial, is “a historically determined 
event”.19  Furthermore, the idea that Jesus has risen into history amounts to a disclosure of 
God’s Being as love, that is, “the direct presentation of the new eon embodied in Christ”.20  
Yet, we are faced with an ambiguity of what remains beyond representation in historical time, 
as when Christ rises “into history” after his death on the Cross.  At this juncture, the 
Levinasian idea of the trace of illeity can be pressed into service.  First, let us examine the 
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diachronic aspect of the trace and its relevance to a theology of the Resurrection.  The event 
of Resurrection is, in some obvious sense, an interruption of historical time; it disturbs 
synchronic time with an unthematisable deed and word of God.  The “appointed time”, the 
kairos, of Jesus’ rising into history is not measurable by quantitative “clock time”.  It 
introduces a qualitative change in time as it summons to a new sense of time as awakening to 
responsibility to the other in the light of the Incarnation and Paschal Mystery.   The 
diachronic time of Christ’s encounter with the disciples makes up the concreteness of the 
Resurrection event.  It is an encounter outside the disciples’ capacity to measure or reduce the 
appearance of the Risen Christ to an act of their transcendental consciousness.  In place of an 
all-reductive subjectivity, the disciples are overwhelmed by a time-transforming otherness.  
Through the gift of Holy Spirit, time is torn away from its moorings in the structure of self-
sufficiency, to be drawn into a new time of responsibility.  In this state of deep passivity, in 
the all-summoning proximity of the other, the disciples are taken out of themselves, and so 
disposed to be possessed by the Spirit of Christ. 
 
Hence, the diachrony in the Resurrection event prohibits the disciples trying to grasp Christ’s 
Resurrection as an ontological unveiling or as a synchronic experience.  For the objectivity or 
otherness of the Resurrection is not related to the disciples’ transcendental ego, as though 
Christ were an empirical object or intuited essence.  Levinas’ understanding of diachrony 
permits viewing the Resurrection, not as a phenomenal appearance in synchronic time, but 
more through a pure passivity to the other who comes from beyond the frame of any 
presence.  In this way, Christ’s Resurrection breaks open the disciples’ consciousness and its 
thematising propensities.  Christ’s own state of absolute passivity is the mark of super-
individuation effected through the Cross and Holy Saturday.  He bears the trauma of the 
wounds of his obedience to the Father.  Having risen from the dead, Christ now faces the 
disciples in the Spirit of a new time, transcendence and responsibility. 
 
Von Balthasar, however, limits his understanding of the non-phenomenality of the 
Resurrection. He expresses Jesus’ Resurrection more in terms of the synchrony of being 
rather than the diachrony of time.  But the synchrony of being works in reductive fashion, and 
constricts the full disclosure of truth.  In ontological terms, the “truth” of Christ’s 
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Resurrection would be reduced to a thematisation or an objective proposition of experience.21  
In contrast, with a more diachronic inclusion of the Cross and Holy Saturday, the Risen 
Christ is in the non-obectifiable other facing the disciples.  He breathes on them the Holy 
Spirit (Jn 20:22) and opens their minds to a diachronic understanding of the Scriptures in the 
light of what God has done and spoken to him (Luke 24:45).  Thus they are equipped to 
proclaim the Good News and forgive sins.  These dramatic events do not produce an 
experience and objective understanding of Christ’s being.  They are the outcome of Christ 
facing his disciples, marked with the diachronic trace of obedience to the Father’s will. 
 
In the otherness of the face of the Risen Christ, there is both a diachronic and immemorial 
trace.  For Levinas, diachrony and immemorial time are interconnected terms. For diachrony 
is awakening to the immemorial past as an obligation to be responsible prior to any meaning 
of freedom.  On the basis of the Levinasian idea of immemorial time, I would argue that 
Christ’s otherness inspires a responsibility of such far reaching consequence that answers 
even for another’s responsibility - for it communicates the power to forgive and retain sins 
(John 19:23).  By receiving the Spirit, the disciples enter time in its immemoriality, beyond 
the measurements, memories or representations of history, as it recalls “in the beginning with 
God” (John 1:1).  Levinas likens this to the “in” of infinity.22 
 
Through this trace of the immemorial past signified in Christ’s mission and Resurrection, the 
disciples are summoned to their own kind of individuation or non-indifference in the 
Levinasian sense.  Beyond the systematic comprehensions of ontological thought and 
intuitions of essence, and further than any project of the ego-consciousness, the disciples are 
subjected to a responsibility to the point of expiation.  Such substitutionary responsibility 
bears the trace of the Crucifixion and Holy Saturday, as it is still embodied in the wounds of 
the Risen Christ.  When faced with the Risen Other, this responsibility cannot be declined.  
Henceforth, in their new experiences of time, there can be no history that separates them from 
either Christ or the suffering other. 
 
Effacement and Ambiguity 
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So far I have spoken of diachrony and the immemorial past in the disciples’ encounter with 
the Risen Christ.  An effacement is also implied.  For the Spirit comes from Christ to the 
disciples without showing itself, beyond all categories to the point of invisibility and absence; 
for their encounter is beyond the domain of essence.  Resurrection is related to Holy 
Saturday, but in a non-phenomenal manner.  It penetrates the disciples only on the condition 
of unconditional receptivity and passivity to the inspiration of the Spirit and the will of the 
Father.  The self-surrender involved with their encounter with Christ parallels Christ’s own 
individuation or self-abandonment on Holy Saturday.  As the dead were able to hear the 
Father’s word of salvation through the Spirit, so in the same Spirit emanating from the Risen 
Christ, do the disciples become witnesses to the offer of salvation to all.  In overwhelming 
consciousness, in turning it inside out and rendering it incapable of containing the event of 
salvation in any present, God’s word is revealed in its transcendence, and its self-effacing 
character.  In short, there is confusion and ambiguity surrounding the revelation of God’s 
word. 
 
The non-phenomenality of Christ’s Resurrection also signifies ambiguity.  If the Father’s 
word in the Risen Christ betokens a transcendence to the point of absence, it is in reference to 
the ethical site in which that word can be articulated.  The ambiguity involved means that the 
disciples cannot simply preach salvation to the world apart from their own responsibility.   
The meaning of salvation must be signified in a place and time when the neighbour’s face 
draws near in all its forsakenness - otherwise God’s transcendence will be reduced to essence.  
Furthermore, the non-phenomenality of the Resurrection has resulted in dogmatic statements 
(doxa) of God’s beauty, goodness and truth.  But such statements could be proposed within 
involving responsibility in this Levinasian sense.  Hence, theology, if it is intent on 
appreciating God’s transcendent alterity, must grapple with such ambivalence.  Theology 
needs to be critically aware of the ease with which “God” can simply be thematised as a 
presence in consciousness.  When theology tries to conceive of praxis and dogma together, it 
must continually pass through ambiguity, in the realisation that it could fall back into onto-
theology and its associated form of presence.  Only by way of “a crooked road”, as Levinas 
remarks, can God’s word be signified in the world.23 
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Until now I have tried to show how the non-phenomenal characteristics of the Levinasian 
idea of the trace of illeity (otherness), namely diachrony, immemorial past, effacing and 
ambiguity, provide a unique perspective to the Resurrection.  It remains to show how the idea 
of the Risen Christ’s otherness can challenge von Balthasar’s analogical understanding of the 
indissoluble perichoresis between doxa (statements about God) and the beautiful, the good 
and the true.  Here, it will be a matter of  a concording of dogma and praxis.  
 
The Resurrection and the Holy Spirit 
When the disciples received the Spirit, they were inspired with the necessary grace to 
participate in Christ’s self-abandonment.  In their encounter with Christ, as I read it, the 
disciples are inspired by his otherness, as he breathes the Holy Spirit on them.  In the Spirit of 
Christ crucified and risen, the disciples are individuated to a life of expiation and 
responsibility for the lost and the dead.  From a different angle, the Spirit-inspired 
individuation also signifies an indissoluble perichoresis between doxa, such as in, “If you 
forgive the sins of any, they are forgiven them; if you retain the sins of any, they are retained” 
(Jn 20:23) and the Paschal encounter with the non-phenomenality of Christ’s death, his going 
to the dead and of his rising from the dead.  A concordance of dogma and praxis occurs 
through the disciples’ encounter with Christ’s otherness.  In its light, they are summoned to 
undertake Christ’s mission to the point of expiation, as we have said.   
 
Here we have the opportunity to articulate the beauty, goodness and truth of Christ’s glory in 
the language of alterity.  An appreciation of the otherness of Christ provides an alternative to 
the analogical structure in von Balthasar’s idea of the indissoluble perichoresis between the 
theological and philosophical transcendentals.   Insofar as doxa concords with Christian 
praxis in the context of the Resurrection, it must exist beyond essence, that is through the 
encounter with the otherness of Christ breathing the Spirit on the disciples.  As a result, the 
glory of the Lord (the beautiful) is testified (the good) through the disciples’ state of 
persecution and humiliation for others (the true).  In this way, the otherness of the Risen 
Christ summons the disciples to live out the beauty, goodness and truth of the Resurrection.  
Hence, beyond any conception of essence and the event of Being, the otherness of Christ 
signifies God’s glory in its good truth as the life of difficult freedom to the point of expiating 
for others.  In this regard, a priority is placed upon the good. 
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Where von Balthasar prioritises the beautiful within an ontological scheme, we suggest 
giving priority, in a non-phenomenal way, to the Good – if we are to come to a critical 
understanding of the divine glory.  In this suggested reprioritisation, the Good is beyond 
being.  It is realised only by way of self-surrender and conformity to the will of the Father, in 
an extreme state of passivity.  In their self-dispossession and dedication to the divine will, the 
followers of Jesus exist beyond analogical or ontological structure that essence might entail.  
In this state of exposure, the disciples are vulnerable to accusation and persecution, and 
awaken to the responsibility of bearing the guilt and wretchedness of others.  This surrender 
of the ontological self for the sake of being responsible for others, resists an analogical 
objectification.  The ethical imperative immeasurably transcends any purely objective 
thematisations. 
 
Conclusion 
Throughout the paper, I have set out to look at the (im)possibilities of a language of alterity 
for theology.  I have emphasised that if God’s transcendence is to have meaning, then an 
approach that passes beyond the ontological must be articulated.  Consequently, towards re-
contextualising von Balthasar’s theology with the language of alterity, I have pursued this 
new formulation by employing Levinas’ ideas of otherness (the trace of illeity), the non-
phenomenality of the face, the there is, encounter, and so forth. 
 
More specifically, I have examined von Balthasar’s theology by developing a non-
phenomenal sense of the Resurrection.  By a selective use of Levinas’ thought, I have been 
able to venture beyond the confinements of phenomenology and ontology to discuss the 
encounter which took place between the Risen Christ and the disciples.   
 
In this evaluation, I have given priority to Levinas’ idea of otherness, and the consequent 
sense of the non-phenomenal.  Further, I have been able to develop the Levinasian ideas of 
encounter, the face, immemorial time, diachrony, ambiguity, effacement and the Good 
beyond Being, all in relation to the Risen Christ meeting with the disciples.  As a focal text, I 
have referred frequently to John 20:19-23.  Here we found an opportunity to develop von 
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Balthasar’s reflection in regard to Easter Sunday.  By applying the Levinasian ideas of illeity 
(“the he in the depth of the you”24), diachrony, the immemorial, effacement and ambiguity, I 
have argued that the Spirit in the depths of the Risen Christ works to individuate the 
disciples, so that they share in the Christ-like self-offering to the Father’s will.  When Christ 
breathes the Spirit on the disciples, they begin to speak of the other beyond quantitative clock 
time, that is to say, proclaim the glory of the Risen Christ.  Hence, rather than having doxa as 
the presupposition for Christian praxis (in Scola’s reading of von Balthasar25) in the context 
of the Resurrection, doxa concords with Christian praxis. 
 
Furthermore, in reference to von Balthasar’s understanding of doxa and Christian praxis, I 
argued that the ideas of God’s glory, beauty, goodness, truth and unity can be better 
understood through the idea of Christ’s otherness, rather than through analogical thought.  
This meant bringing out a non-phenomenal understanding of how the Risen Christ’s 
otherness signifies doxa (Jn 20:23) in the disciples’ disinterestedness.  At stake is signifying 
the encounter with the Risen Christ as encounter beyond essence, and beyond the phenomena 
of experience, so that divine glory might be proclaimed without reducing it to theological 
concepts.   
 
Accordingly, Levinas’ idea of otherness (trace of illeity), with the corresponding aspects of 
diachrony, the immemorial past, effacement and ambiguity, provided an occasion for 
developing von Balthasar’s idea of the indissoluble perichoresis between God’s glory (doxa) 
and the one, the beautiful, the good and the true.  Rather than providing an ontological and 
analogical structure to the theological and philosophical transcendentals, it is more 
appropriate to conceive of them under the aegis of alterity.  The transcendence of Christ’s 
otherness, rather than the transcendental ego, should be the locus in which to speak of the 
indissoluble perichoresis between God’s glory and the interplay of beauty, goodness and 
truth.   
 
In coming to speak of the possibility of Levinas’ thought for Christian theology, it has been a 
task full of complexity. I have engaged Levinas’ ideas with only a fragment of von 
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Balthasar’s theology.  At first glance, it might seem that these notions may in fact limit 
theology.  However, by bringing out Levinas’ non-phenomenal context of alterity, a 
development is possible.  Indeed, he even allows that an ethical metaphysical view of the 
“Man-God” is possible.  He states: 
 
On the one hand, the problem of the Man-God includes the idea of a self-inflicted 
humiliation on the part of the Supreme Being, of a descent of the Creator to the 
level of the Creature; that is to say, an absorption of the most active activity into 
the most passive passivity. 
On the other hand the problem includes, as if brought about by this passivity 
pushed to its ultimate degree in the Passion, the idea of expiation for others, that 
is, of a substitution.  The identical par excellence, the noninterchangeable, the 
unique par excellence, would be substitution itself.26 
 
In this reflection, Levinas attempts to understand whether the idea of a Man-God can be 
related to consciousness.   For him, these ideas have philosophical value, especially as they 
point to the limits of phenomenology.27  But the passage exemplifies why Christian 
theologians have been naturally attracted to his writings: his ideas touch upon the theological 
imagination exciting insights and possibilities. In a final word, we seem to learn so much 
about the Bible and theology from Levinas. His writings have a life, power and spirit of their 
own because they beckon Christian theologians with meaning and an encounter with the 
word of God. Levinas is testimony to the sacredness of Judaism for Christianity. 
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